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UNited StateS v. Leveto
 In the American criminal justice system, a defendant’s right to counsel is among 
one of the most fundamental and essential rights.1 The importance of that 
constitutional right is highlighted by the process that a criminal defendant must go 
through to waive this right and represent himself pro se.2 In order to allow the 
defendant to continue pro se, a trial court must determine that the defendant’s waiver 
of his right to counsel is both knowing and voluntary.3 Moreover, even after a criminal 
defendant waives his right to counsel, the waiver does not bar the defendant from 
later requesting counsel.4
 In United States v. Leveto, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit considered the circumstances under which a defendant’s waiver of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel could be relinquished.5 The defendant, Daniel Leveto, 
made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel at a pre-trial hearing, 
but requested the assistance of counsel on the morning his trial was scheduled to 
begin.6 The district court denied this request, stating that he had validly waived his 
right to counsel and that it was too late to reassert that right.7 The Third Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the timing of a request for counsel 
and the potential for delay constitute good cause to deny a post-waiver request for 
counsel.8 This case comment contends that the Third Circuit ignored a clear trend of 
narrowing the bases upon which a post-waiver request for counsel can be denied. 
The standard crafted by the Third Circuit gives trial courts undue discretion in 
deciding whether to grant counsel, which may result in the subordination of the right 
to counsel to a judge’s perception of “inconvenience.” In such cases, defendants who 
have done nothing improper may lose their liberty due to a lack of legal skill.9
1. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (“Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be 
represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he 
may have.” (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 
(1956) (internal quotation marks omitted))). The right to counsel can be found in the Sixth Amendment, 
which states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2. See United States v. Proctor, 166 F.3d 396, 401 (1st Cir. 1999). “Pro se” is defined as “[f]or oneself; on 
one’s own behalf; without a lawyer.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1258 (8th ed. 2004).
3. United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The court, however, has the responsibility of 
ensuring that any choice of self-representation is made knowingly and intelligently, with an awareness 
of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in defending oneself.”).
4. Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We are certainly unwilling to deny counsel 
because of some conception that the defendant’s initial decision to . . . represent himself at trial is a 
choice cast in stone.”).
5. United States v. Leveto, 540 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
6. Id. at 204–05.
7. Id. at 205–06.
8. Id. at 210.
9. See id. at 213. The standard gives trial courts far too much discretion in determining whether a defendant 
should be granted counsel and undermines the Sixth Amendment presumption that “it is representation 
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 Defendant Daniel Leveto was indicted for federal income tax fraud on February 
15, 2001.10 When he was brought to the district court in March 2004 for his first 
appearance, he expressed an interest in representing himself.11 The district court 
held a hearing on June 7, 2004 to ascertain whether Leveto was asserting his right to 
self-representation.12 After receiving a clear explanation of the ramifications of 
proceeding pro se from both the judge and his attorney, Leveto made a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.13
 Between this waiver and the day of trial, Leveto represented himself with zeal.14 
He made several motions and filed a lawsuit.15 One motion alleged that the execution 
of a search warrant was unconstitutional, and although the district court found no 
violation, the Third Circuit later ruled in Leveto’s favor.16 A week before trial, Leveto 
sued Judge Cohill, alleging the judge was biased in his handling of pre-trial motions.17 
Specifically, Leveto argued that Judge Cohill improperly extended the government’s 
time to answer pre-trial motions.18 On the evening before trial, Leveto moved to recuse 
Judge Cohill, arguing that the judge’s status as a defendant in the civil lawsuit created 
a conflict of interest.19 The next morning, Judge Cohill denied this motion.20
 Just before jury selection began, Leveto requested the assistance of counsel.21 
Although the court denied this request, Leveto continued to request counsel 
throughout voir dire.22 When asked if he wanted to make an opening statement, 
by counsel that is the standard, not the exception.” Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth 
Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000).
10. Leveto, 540 F.3d at 204.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id. Specifically, a defendant must be made aware of:
[T]he magnitude of the undertaking and the “disadvantages of self-representation,”: an 
awareness that there are technical rules governing the conduct of a trial, and that 
presenting a defense is not a simple matter of telling one’s story. In addition, the accused 
should have a general appreciation of the seriousness of the charge and of the penalties 
he may be exposed to before deciding to take a chance on his own skill.
 Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 1976) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
835 (1975)) (citations omitted).
14. Leveto, 540 F.3d at 205.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 216 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 205 (majority opinion).
18. Id. at 216 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 205 (majority opinion).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 205–06. “Voir dire” is “[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to 
decide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury. Loosely, the term refers to the 
jury-selection phase of a trial.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1605 (8th ed. 2004).
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Leveto explained that “due to the sheer intimidation of all this . . . I seem to be 
having difficulties and mental blocks, and I am asking you again to have an attorney 
represent me.”23 The district court denied each request for counsel.24 Significantly, 
standby counsel had participated in all pre-trial proceedings and was required by law 
to be prepared to step in immediately.25 Ignoring this circumstance, as well as the 
fact that Leveto never asked for a continuance,26 Judge Cohill stated, “[u]nder the 
circumstances of this case, I can’t imagine stopping now and appointing [the standby 
counsel] or anyone else to represent you and prepare to defend a case like this.”27 
Later in the trial, Leveto claimed he was not aware that he could not reassert his 
right to counsel, and Judge Cohill responded that it was not possible to relinquish a 
waiver on the day of trial.28 Throughout Leveto’s trial, the court denied his repeated 
requests for counsel.29 Although Leveto represented himself to the best of his ability, 
he was ultimately found guilty.30
 Following his trial, Leveto appealed to the Third Circuit.31 He contended that 
the district court’s refusal to appoint a lawyer violated his right to counsel.32 The 
Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion, holding that the timing of a 
request for counsel constitutes good cause for denying a post-waiver request for 
counsel.33 The Third Circuit rejected Leveto’s assertion that the potential for delay 
was not an adequate basis for denying a motion to appoint counsel, concluding that 
district courts are always charged with managing their dockets.34 The majority held 
that “the last-minute timing of a motion is generally a proper factor in considering 
whether to grant the motion, particularly where, as is the case here, the timing of the 
motion is part and parcel with the consideration of whether disruption would result 
if the motion was granted.”35
 In reaching its conclusion, however, the majority did not consider the reasoning 
employed by other Circuit Courts that had analyzed the issue.36 Relying strictly on 
23. Leveto, 540 F.3d at 205.
24. Id. at 205–06.
25. Id. at 217 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 205 (majority opinion) (alteration in original).
28. Id. at 206.
29. Id. at 205–06.
30. Id. at 206.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 210.
34. Id. at 209–10.
35. Id. at 210.
36. See id. at 206–07, 210 (referring to the fact patterns and outcomes of cases without any in-depth analysis 
of the deciding court’s reasoning).
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dicta and factual similarities,37 the Leveto majority missed a major shift in this area 
of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. While the Third Circuit has given courts great 
discretion to deny criminal defendants’ last-minute requests for counsel, other Circuit 
Courts have shifted to rules that provide such defendants greater protection of their 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.38
 The dissent questioned the majority’s holding and its reasoning. While the majority 
held that trial courts can consider delay as a factor weighing against granting a last-
minute request for counsel, the dissent argued that prior case law did not preclude Leveto’s 
request.39 Relying on many of the same cases cited by the majority, the dissent contended 
that a defendant’s last-minute request for counsel can only be denied when meaningful 
trial proceedings have begun, or when a defendant abuses his right to counsel in order to 
cause delay.40 Since no meaningful trial proceedings had begun when Leveto made his 
first request for counsel, the first ground for denying such a request did not provide a 
basis for the trial court’s decision.41 Moreover, since standby counsel would have been 
ready to proceed immediately,42 and there was no evidence that Leveto’s request was 
made with the goal of delaying trial, the dissent opined that the second basis for denial 
was also unavailable and that the trial court should have been reversed.43
 The Third Circuit’s holding that last-minute requests for counsel may be denied 
based on possible delay, even if the defendant does not request a continuance, allows 
courts far too much discretion. While older cases support the Third Circuit’s 
approach, the clear trend in the Circuit Courts has been to protect the right to 
counsel by rejecting tests based on the nebulous concept of delay, and adopting tests 
that narrow the circumstances under which post-waiver requests for counsel can be 
denied. First, the Seventh Circuit transformed vague concerns over delay into a 
bright-line rule to determine when last-minute requests can be denied.44 The Fifth 
Circuit separated the issues of delay and counsel, ensuring that defendants are not 
denied counsel if standby counsel is able to assume representation without causing 
delay.45 Finally, the First Circuit held there are only two grounds for denying counsel, 
one of which resembled the Seventh Circuit test.46
37. See id.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 63–84.
39. See Leveto, 540 F.3d at 213–14.
40. Id. at 213 (citing Proctor, 166 F.3d at 402 and United States v. Merchant, 992 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 
1993)).
41. Id. at 213–14.
42. Id. at 217.
43. See id. at 213–14 (“It is clear, however, that Leveto attempted to reinvoke his right to counsel prior to 
trial and jury selection, before any trial proceedings, let alone ‘meaningful’ ones. . . . There is no evidence 
of a purpose that would justify the court’s refusal here—namely to delay or disrupt trial.”).
44. United States v. Tolliver, 937 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1999).
45. United States v. Pollani, 146 F.3d 269, 273–74 (5th Cir. 1998).
46. Proctor, 166 F.3d at 402.
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 These more specific guidelines reduce judicial discretion over last-minute requests 
for counsel, and thus, provide greater protection of Sixth Amendment rights. Had 
any of these approaches been adopted by the Third Circuit, Leveto would likely have 
been granted counsel. This case comment contends that the Third Circuit 
misconstrued the existing body of law and ignored a trend of increased protection of 
the post-waiver right to counsel. It further argues that the Third Circuit’s holding 
runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment because it does not provide adequate protection 
of the right to counsel. Given that the average person lacks the requisite level of legal 
skill and knowledge to adequately litigate in court, and considering the liberty 
interests at stake in a criminal trial, it is important to create a legal standard that 
ensures defendants are not denied counsel without good reason.47
 The Third Circuit’s holding is reminiscent of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Solina, in which two defendants were tried for assault in one proceeding.48 
One defendant was represented by a public defender, while the other proceeded pro 
se.49 On the day of trial, the first defendant’s attorney moved for a continuance, and the 
pro se defendant requested counsel due to his inability to adequately defend himself.50 
Notwithstanding the suspicious nature and timing of both requests, the Solina court 
held that “the scheduling problems the continuances would have caused were in 
themselves sufficient ground for refusing to delay the trial, in the absence of any showing 
that either . . . appointed counsel or [defendant] (assisted by standby counsel) were 
incapable of conducting an adequate defense.”51
 The Leveto court erroneously followed the very broad and dated approach of the 
Seventh Circuit in Solina.52 Solina was decided in 1984, and while it has not been 
overruled, the Seventh Circuit has since tightened its standards for denying last-
minute requests for counsel.53 For example, in United States v. Tolliver, the Seventh 
Circuit paid lip service to Solina, but applied a more restrictive standard to last-
47. See Pollani, 146 F.3d at 272–73.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the 
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for 
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. . . . He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does 
not know how to establish his innocence[.]
 Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)).
48. United States v. Solina, 733 F.2d 1208, 1211 (7th Cir. 1984).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1212 (emphasis added).
52. Compare id. (stating that “the scheduling problems the continuances would have caused were in themselves 
sufficient ground for refusing to delay the trial” (emphasis added)), with Leveto, 540 F.3d at 210 (noting 
that “the last-minute timing of a motion is generally a proper factor in considering whether to grant the 
motion” (emphasis added)).
53. See Tolliver, 937 F.2d 1183.
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minute requests for counsel.54 The defendant requested counsel after the government 
had presented its first witness at trial.55 Distinguishing a case in which the Eleventh 
Circuit held that a defendant was entitled to counsel when his request came 
approximately fifteen minutes prior to trial,56 the Seventh Circuit held that a trial 
court may deny “requests for counsel made after meaningful trial proceedings have 
begun.”57 Thus, the start of trial serves as a decisive, clear line for determining 
whether a request for counsel should be granted.
 This bright-line approach was more definitive and workable than the approach 
used in Solina, signifying a departure from the Seventh Circuit’s previous reliance on 
“scheduling problems” as an acceptable basis for denial of counsel.58 Had the Leveto 
court applied the “meaningful trial proceedings” standard used in Tolliver, Leveto’s 
request for counsel would have been granted. Tolliver requested counsel after jury 
selection and the fact-finding process had already begun.59 In contrast, Leveto 
requested counsel prior to the start of jury selection.60 Therefore, it is clear that 
Leveto’s request did not come after “meaningful trial proceedings” had started. 
Though Judge Cohill ruled that requests made on the day of trial are too disruptive 
to be granted,61 Tolliver explicitly held otherwise.62
 Some courts have gone further than the Tolliver court, crafting standards even 
more protective of Sixth Amendment rights. For example, in United States v. Pollani, 
the Fifth Circuit severed the issue of “continuance” from the issue of “counsel,” 
54. Id. at 1187. The Seventh Circuit cited Solina for the proposition that when a defendant chooses to 
proceed pro se, the trial court will hold him to his decision. Id. However, rather than focus on the vague 
concept of “delay” established in Solina, the Tolliver court specifically noted, “[i]t is well within the 
discretion of the court to deny as untimely requests for counsel made after meaningful trial proceedings 
have begun.” Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 1186.
56. Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 715–16 (11th Cir. 1990). While the Tolliver court did not disagree 
with the result in Horton, it distinguished the facts of the two cases. It noted that granting a continuance 
in the middle of a trial, as Tolliver asked the trial court to do, would be far more disruptive than the 
situation in Horton, which merely postponed the trial before it even began. Tolliver, 937 F.2d at 1187.
57. Tolliver, 937 F.2d at 1187.
58. Compare id. (“It is well within the discretion of the court to deny as untimely requests for counsel made 
after meaningful trial proceedings have begun.” (emphasis added)), with Solina, 733 F.2d at 1212 (“[T]he 
scheduling problems the continuances would have caused were in themselves sufficient ground for refusing 
to delay the trial . . . .” (emphasis added)).
59. Tolliver, 937 F.2d at 1186. Specifically, opening statements and the first witness’s testimony had already 
begun. Id.
60. Leveto, 540 F.3d at 205.
61. See id. at 206 (“Leveto: I just was not aware that you couldn’t relinquish [a waiver of the right to counsel]. 
I know that I did it. I am sure that everyone knows that I did it here. . . . Judge: But, you can’t relinquish 
it the day of the trial. This has been pending for years and no lawyer could possibly go in and act as a 
lawyer the day of the trial in a case like this without preparation time.”).
62. See Tolliver, 937 F.2d at 1188 (discussing the facts of Horton, 895 F.2d at 717).
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thereby strengthening the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.63 Pollani had originally 
proceeded pro se, but four days before trial, moved the court to allow standby counsel 
to act as his attorney for the trial.64 Although the defendant wanted to be represented 
by his standby counsel even if no continuance was granted,65 the trial court denied 
his motion, stating that “Pollani had made a ‘knowing decision’ to represent himself, 
and an eleventh hour substitution of counsel would not be permitted.”66
 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the district court “validly protected [its 
interest in maintaining its docket and keeping cases on schedule] by refusing to allow 
Pollani to manipulate the trial date by strategically timing the hiring of counsel.”67 
The Fifth Circuit explicitly held that “[t]he justifications for proceeding on schedule 
do not, however, justify the district court’s refusal to allow [standby counsel] to 
participate. . . . [The defendant] still had the option to be represented by counsel to 
the extent that he could do so without interrupting the orderly processes of the 
court.”68 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant’s interest in 
proceeding with adequate counsel outweighed concerns about delay and the attorney’s 
lack of preparation.69 It held that when a defendant makes a pre-trial motion to have 
standby counsel represent him at trial, and appointing counsel would not cause delay, 
the court must grant the motion.70
 It is obvious that had the more protective rule enumerated in Pollani been applied, 
Leveto’s request for counsel would have been granted. Pollani authorized the 
appointment of standby counsel without giving counsel time to prepare in order to 
avoid delay.71 In that case, there were no conflicts or other issues that prevented the 
standby attorney from fully representing Pollani.72 Similarly, Leveto’s attorney was 
present and able to represent Leveto; he “had been standby counsel for almost a year, 
participated in pre-trial conferences, received discovery, attended the suppression 
hearing, and arranged his schedule to be present at trial and available should Leveto 
63. See Pollani, 146 F.3d at 273–74 (holding that the lower court’s denial of a continuance was entirely 
justified, but that its denial of counsel was not).
64. Id. at 270–71.
65. Id. at 271.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 272. The court even accepted as fact “that Pollani was vigorously attempting to delay the start of 
trial.” Id. at 273.
68. Id. at 273–74. Interestingly, the Third Circuit has implicitly acknowledged that standby counsel is 
sometimes required to assume full representation. See Leveto, 540 F.3d at 217 (noting that one of the 
inherent duties of standby counsel is that “he or she ‘must be ready to step in if the accused wishes to 
terminate his own representation.’” (quoting United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018–19 (3d Cir. 
1993))).
69. See Pollani, 146 F.3d at 273–74.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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require assistance in his defense.”73 Because these facts indicate that standby counsel 
could have represented Leveto without any delay,74 the Pollani rule would have 
required the court to appoint standby counsel without requiring an allowance of time 
to prepare.
 While courts in subsequent cases have not been as generous to defendants as the 
Pollani court was, they have set out more predictable, workable factors than “delay,” 
and consequently are more protective of Sixth Amendment rights. For example, the 
First Circuit has outlined a particularized and disciplined test, which has been the 
approach of many Courts of Appeals.75 In United States v. Proctor, the defendant 
requested counsel at a pre-trial suppression hearing.76 The trial court denied his 
motion, but the defendant thought the judge had denied counsel for not only the 
suppression hearing, but also for the trial.77 The First Circuit began its analysis by 
outlining a clear framework: “It . . . is within the district court’s discretion to refuse 
a defendant’s request to withdraw from self-representation after a valid waiver if a 
defendant seeks counsel in an apparent effort to delay or disrupt proceedings on the 
eve of trial, or once trial is well underway.”78
 Applying this standard in Proctor, the court noted that since the trial was not due 
to begin for a month, the “after meaningful proceedings” rule was not a proper basis 
for denying the request for counsel.79 With respect to the argument that Proctor’s 
request was in fact a manipulation designed to cause delay,80 the First Circuit noted:
73. Leveto, 540 F.3d at 217.
74. Id.
75. See Proctor, 166 F.3d at 402; see also Tolliver, 937 F.2d at 1187; Merchant, 992 F.2d at 1095 (adopting the 
“meaningful trial proceedings” standard); United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that a defendant may not “repeatedly . . . alternate his position on counsel in order to delay his 
trial or otherwise obstruct the orderly administration of justice”); Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 700 
(9th Cir. 1989) (“When, for example, for purposes of delay, criminal defendants have sought continuances 
on the eve of trial, we have refused to disrupt the proceedings to accommodate their wishes.”).
76. See Proctor, 166 F.3d at 398–400.
77. See id. at 400 (“Proctor contends that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to an 
attorney when it refused at the July 16th hearing to allow him to ‘go ahead and get another lawyer’ to 
represent him at trial.” (emphasis added)). The court accepted his argument that if the trial judge denied 
him counsel for the entire trial, it would be a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 403. It held 
it would not be a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the denial applied only to the July 
16th hearing. Id.
78. Id. at 402. Thus, according to the First Circuit, the first acceptable reason to deny a post-waiver request 
for counsel—if the defendant “seek[s] to manipulate the trial process to suit his own interests”—
distinguishes the type of delay requested for “good cause” from the type requested for the sake of delay. 
Id. at 403. The second basis for denying a last minute request for counsel applies when the request is 
made “once trial is well underway”—practically the same standard that had been applied in Tolliver. See 
id. at 402; see also Tolliver, 937 F.2d at 1187 (“It is well within the discretion of the court to deny as 
untimely requests for counsel made after meaningful trial proceedings have begun.”).
79. See Proctor, 166 F.3d at 403.
80. See id. (noting that there was no abuse of the right to counsel in order to cause delay, after determining 
that trial was a month away, and the “meaningful trial proceedings ” standard did not apply).
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[W]hile Proctor’s earlier rejection of two attorneys and the timing of his most 
recent f lip-f lop over representation may have afforded some grounds for 
suspicion that he was seeking to manipulate the trial process to suit his own 
interests, these factors alone—without judicial inquiry eliciting further 
evidence and express findings on the issue of bad faith manipulation—were 
insufficiently compelling to permit a court to reject out of hand any new 
request for counsel.81
Thus, the Proctor court required very specific findings on the issue of whether the 
motion for counsel was made for the purpose of delaying trial.82 It was not enough, 
according to the court, to merely raise an inference of what the defendant’s motivation 
could be.83 Moreover, the Proctor court attributed the defendant’s request to a 
realization of “the value of counsel once confronted with the inadequacy of his own 
legal skills in the face of actual courtroom problems.”84
 Ignoring this framework entirely and relying solely on the fact that the Proctor 
court affirmed the denial of counsel for the suppression hearing, the Leveto court 
broadly concluded that a trial judge may consider delay when deciding whether or 
not to appoint counsel.85 However, the First Circuit’s decision to uphold the denial of 
counsel did not rest only on the possibility of delay. Rather, the Proctor court 
considered several factors, including the judge’s grasp of the issues, the merits of the 
defendant’s arguments, the non-dispositive nature of the motion, and the breadth of 
the defendant’s request.86 Most importantly, the Leveto majority overlooked the very 
clear legal standard applied in Proctor, which provided two specific grounds for 
denying post-waiver requests for counsel made immediately before the start of trial,87 
and focused merely on the timing of the request.88
 Under the Proctor standard, Leveto’s request for counsel would not have been 
denied. The first basis for denying counsel—requesting counsel with a solely dilatory 
motive—does not apply here. At the time of his request, Leveto had failed to settle 
the case, lost an important suppression motion, and lost a motion to recuse only 
81. Id.
82. See id. (noting that “without judicial inquiry eliciting further evidence and express findings on the issue 
of bad faith manipulation,” the rejection of two attorneys was insufficient for denying a new request for 
counsel).
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See Leveto, 540 F.3d at 206 (“Yet the defendant in Proctor made his request at a motions hearing one 
month before the start of trial. Further, the court stated in dicta that the ‘last minute timing’ of a request 
could provide a basis for the denial of a request that would pass constitutional scrutiny.”).
86. See Proctor, 166 F.3d at 403. The defendant requested counsel “for the rest of the trial proceedings, or 
only for the rest of the day.” Id.
87. See id. at 402 (applying the “apparent effort to delay or disrupt proceedings on the eve of trial” test).
88. See Leveto, 540 F.3d at 206 (“Further, the [Proctor] court stated in dicta that the ‘last minute timing’ of a 
request could provide a basis for the denial of a request that would pass constitutional scrutiny.”).
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moments before trial.89 It is surely reasonable for any defendant to request counsel 
after this string of personal failures.90
 The second basis for denying counsel calls for an examination of the defendant’s 
relationship with his attorneys to determine whether there was bad faith on the part 
of the defendant to delay trial.91 There is nothing in the Leveto record, apart from the 
timing, evidencing such an abuse of the right to counsel.92 Leveto had never dismissed 
or substituted counsel, nor had he ever f lip-flopped in his decisions.93 Although the 
majority inferred a dilatory motive from Leveto’s motion to recuse the trial judge,94 
the Proctor test did not analyze the defendant’s motions, delays due to plea bargaining, 
or other procedural facts; it parsed the defendant’s history with his attorneys to 
determine if the defendant was abusing his Sixth Amendment right in order to delay 
trial.95 As a matter of policy, a defendant should not be forced to waive his right to 
make motions and arguments in order to preserve his right to counsel.
 While the Proctor, Pollani, and Tolliver tests differ, they all place a special 
importance on the right to counsel. This is likely due to the policy concerns underlying 
the Sixth Amendment. It is a widely accepted truism that even the most prepared 
pro se defendant is often less efficient and effective in court than the least prepared 
professional lawyer.96 The familiarity with rules of criminal procedure and evidence, 
and general trial structure alone, make any criminal lawyer more efficient and 
effective than a pro se defendant.97 Particularly in criminal cases, the stakes are too 
high to ignore the importance of counsel.
 Deferring to these policy concerns, the majority of Circuit Courts have created 
rules designed to appoint counsel to worthy defendants and deny unreasonable or 
abusive requests.98 For example, Tolliver focused on whether the request for counsel 
89. See id. at 216 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. See Proctor, 166 F.3d at 403.
92. See Leveto, 540 F.3d at 216.
93. Id. at 215–16.
94. See id. at 208 (majority opinion). The court noted:
We find here that events just prior to Leveto’s motion for counsel obviated the need for 
a formal inquiry about the underlying reasons for his request and the District Court’s 
decision.
 Immediately before Leveto’s morning-of-trial request for counsel, the District 
Court considered his motion to recuse, mailed from prison the night before. . . . The 
District Court ruled that this motion lacked merit, and it went further to characterize 
the motion to recuse as a thinly veiled tactic to manipulate the proceedings.
 Id.
95. See Proctor, 166 F.3d at 403.
96. See Pollani, 146 F.3d at 274 (“[I]t is eminently reasonable to expect that [standby counsel] could have 
presented a better defense with three days of preparation than could Pollani with three months.”).
97. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Proctor, 166 F.3d 396; Tolliver, 937 F.2d 1183; Pollani, 146 F.3d 269.
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occurred before or after trial had begun.99 The Pollani court held that a request to be 
fully represented by standby counsel should be granted even if a continuance was 
inappropriate.100 Finally, the Proctor court stated that there are only two specific 
reasons for denying counsel, one of which incorporated the Tolliver test.101 These 
standards grant judges almost no discretion in appointing counsel, and guarantee 
that criminal defendants will not be denied their right to counsel when standby 
counsel is readily available.
 Nevertheless, the Leveto majority moved in the opposite direction, reasoning in a 
manner more consistent with cases decided a quarter century ago, and focusing solely 
on the maintenance of court schedules.102 The majority’s decision is very likely to 
significantly alter the landscape of Sixth Amendment law. In rejecting more specific 
rules for the “last minute” standard—even when a defendant is willing to forgo a 
continuance—the Third Circuit gave trial courts wide latitude in deciding post-
waiver requests for counsel. Such discretion is inappropriate in the context of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The inherent danger in granting this discretion 
to trial courts is that judges will choose efficiency interests over a criminal defendant’s 
right to counsel, when in fact, the right to counsel should prevail. To prevent courts 
from wielding unnecessarily broad power when deciding these motions, courts 
considering this issue should adopt clear and more specific guidelines such as those 
used in Pollani, Tolliver, and Proctor.103
99. See Tolliver, 937 F.2d at 1188.
100. Pollani, 146 F.3d at 273–74.
101. See Proctor, 166 F.3d at 402 (“It also is within the district court’s discretion to refuse a defendant’s 
request to withdraw from self-representation after a valid waiver if a defendant seeks counsel in an 
apparent effort to delay or disrupt proceedings on the eve of trial, or once trial is well under way.”); 
Tolliver, 937 F.2d at 1188.
102. Compare Proctor, 166 F.3d 396, Tolliver, 937 F.2d 1183, and Pollani, 146 F.3d 269, with Leveto, 540 F.3d 
at 215–16 and Solina, 733 F.2d 1208.
103. See Proctor, 166 F.3d at 405–06; Tolliver, 937 F.2d at 1187–88; Pollani, 146 F.3d at 273.
